Thoughts on Kony & LRA: Kevin Dunn

I came across this question and answer with one of the foremost thinkers on African political theory today, Professor Kevin Dunn. This man's work is critical, honest, and insightful. My favorite book on African political theory thus far is a compilation he co-edited called Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory.

Here is what he had to say (source: https://matisak.wordpress.com/2010/03/31/ugandas-nightmare-joseph-kony-and-lords-resistance-army/):

Uganda’s nightmare: Joseph Kony and Lord’s Resistance Army

Posted on 31/03/2010 by matisak

LRA forces are responsible for thousands of causalities, terrorism, torture, mutilation, rape, sexual enslavement, training of child soldiers… According to Human Rights Watch Lord’s Resistance Army killed at least 321 civilians and abducted 250 others, including at least 80 children, during a previously unreported four-day rampage in the Makombo area of northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo in December 2009.

Questions:

1. What are the main reasons such an obscure and brutal group as LRA is still active after more than 20 years since it was formed? Is it important the group is based on some mixture of religions, ideologies and mysticism?

2. How would you describe the role of Joseph Kony in LRA? Will his capture or death change anything?

3. How to deal with LRA? What would be the most affective way?

Answers:

Kevin Dunn, Department of Political Science, Hobart and William Smith Colleges

1. The most obvious reason for their continuing activity is that, on the one hand, they haven’t been defeated militarily and, on the other hand, they continue to represent some substantial animosities that the people in northern Uganda have towards the central government. Assumptions that the war would end when Sudanese support was discontinued proved to be false. Attempts to defeat them on the battlefield have repeatedly failed. The role of religious discourses is significant, in that it reflects the intersection of spiritual and political beliefs in northern Uganda, as well as in much of Africa. Early on, as the LRA grew and drew in remnants of other armed movements, its became a complex mix of political and spiritual interests, and it is hard to separate the two at this point. The spiritual components of the LRA resonate with certain sectors of society largely because they help provide a semblance of social order for some people in northern Ugandan that has been under profound crisis (politically, economically, spiritually) for several decades.

2. Joseph Kony is the spiritual head of the LRA and he is the grand strategist. But he is surrounded by lieutenants who are masterful military minds. His arrest and/or death would be a significant blow to the movement (his continued survival, after all, is regarded as proof of his spiritual powers), but it would probably not kill the movement.

3. If the last two decades illustrates anything it is that complete military victory is beyond the reach of the Ugandan army. Kony has illustrated a desire to negotiate several times, but those attempts have repeatedly failed, not least because of unrealistic demands placed on Kony. For example, it is understandable he would balk at the last peace agreement when there were no assurances that he wouldn’t be handed over to the International Criminal Court. If the ICC charges against Kony and his lieutenants can be resolved, that will go a long way towards helping a negotiated settlement. But beyond that, perhaps the most effective way of dealing with the LRA would be to start negotiating directly with some of Kony’s lieutenants (a number of whom have appeared at various times to have been willing to work out an agreement). That might not end the war, but it would significantly weaken the movement and Kony’s command over the group.

Andreas Mehler, Director of  GIGA Institute of African Affairs

1. The mixture of motivations you mention was probably very important in the initial phase of the existence of the organisation. Meanwhile, the most important elements to sustain the movement is a) a very basic ‘economy of war’ (plunder ) and b) forced recruitment, the immediate urge to kill someone and subsequently not being acceptable any more to ‘normal’ society. The commander do not care about a broader legitimacy, just loyalty of fighters. LRA structures in fact live from plunder and as long as there are defenseless communities scattered in the Central African forest and bush they have enough targets.

2. Kony gave the organisation the mystical-religious flair it needed to survive during the first years. I am not convinced that his death would bring everything to an end. Even junior commanders see no way back into peaceful society, they will fight till the end.

3. In the case of LRA it is difficult to see any peaceful way out of the crisis, although it remains important for the Ugandan side of the equation to better integrate the original ethnic basis of the movement. But as LRA operates now far from ‘home’ this is no longer the main unresolved dilemma. Only a coordinated military strategy by all countries involved – not only spotting the troops and fighting them offensively, but also defending villages in the entire zone of operation – may prove effective.